Classical Liberals are totally opposed to any state ownership of means of production. Although privatization has been an official policy of the Egyptian government for two decades, the state still owns hundreds of industrial facilities, financial institutions and service platforms, in addition to most of the country's land through the arms of the Public Sector, the Public Business Sector, the Business Agencies and the various business bodies of the Armed Forces.

Classical Liberals are totally opposed to any state ownership of means of production. Although privatization has been an official policy of the Egyptian government for two decades, the state still owns hundreds of industrial facilities, financial institutions and service platforms, in addition to most of the country's land through the arms of the Public Sector, the Public Business Sector, the Business Agencies and the various business bodies of the Armed Forces.

Hence, the first challenge facing our privatization program is to come up with a comprehensive survey of state property from the data available, which is both scarce and complex. Afterwards, privatization priorities will be calculated by striking a balance between economic and social considerations. The most difficult and most needed aspect of the whole enterprise will be the formulation of convincing arguments to support privatization proposals. While the opposition of political activists and commentators to privatization is usually principled, the general public is more concerned with practical matters, especially those pertaining to corruption. Stressing Transparency and Simplicity as necessary conditions for a sound privatization policy, we will seek to show, by simple facts and sympathetic arguments, how everybody will be better off when government relinquishes all aspects of production.

This is one of the most heated topics in Egyptian politics, but one of the least understood. Most Egyptians unaware of the distinction between natural monopoly and monopolistic practices, and while arbitrary accusations are chewed in the media on daily basis, legal action is taken on scarce occasions. This program aims at breaking down the issue to its simplest elements, helping average Egyptians understand what is at stake, while at the same time working toawrds more specific antitrust legislation. 

Egypt adopted its first antitrust law only five years ago with the issuing of law 3/2005 on Protection of Competition and Prevention of Monopolistic Practices. Although we have reservations on many aspects of the law, e.g. giving government the right to set prices and confining the right to litigate in antitrust lawsuits to the relevant minister, the real problem with the law is that the concept of protecting competition itself is obscure to most Egyptians. In 2009, the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) received 11 complaints and 2 requests of opinion, whereas the French Competition Authority (FCA) received 115 complaints and 65 requests of opinion. If we consider the fact that the ECA, unlike the FCA, is the sole authority on competition law, these statistics show that the law barely helps protect competition.

Our antitrust program will begin with drafting more rigorous legislation. Although this looks like we look to expand regulation, we are more concerned with elaboration than expansion. The present law defines monopolistic practices in theoretical terms, which prevents average Egyptians from understanding how to use the law to their benefit. Therefore, we will seek to explain the guiding principles of antitrust law simply and thoroughly, and help in training lawyers to file complaints and lawsuits. Moreover, one tempting aspect of antitrust law is the possibility of using it against government restrictions of market entry.

Subsidy is always bad policy. However, cuts in subsidies are always painful to beneficiaries and, by extension, governments. Therefore, the chief goal of this program is to provide for socially adequate arguments for the removal of all subsidies. This will require a thorough and sympathetic study of the socio-economic factors of such a radical measure. Also, this program will be responsible for countering similar interventionist policies, e.g. minimum wage or price ceilings, which are not currently imposed in Egypt.

In the fiscal year 07/08, the Egyptian Government spent more than US$ 15 billion on subsidies, accounting for about 30% of total public expenditures and including an astounding US$ 11 billion in energy subsidies. While all subsidies typically defeat their own purpose, the Egyptian system of blind subsidies, i.e. subsidizing a certain good at the source, is particularly ridiculous. A gallon of gasoline costs US $1.2 at retail price; around half of what its unsubsidized price would be, for rich and poor alike. Government subsidizes flour in order to lower the prices of bread for poorer consumers, which leads owners of subsidy-receiving bakeries to smuggle their share of flour to commercial bakeries, leaving consumers to fight over limited quantities of subsidized bread. Even when the government intervenes to make sure this does not happen, consumers buy more bread to use for other purposes, mainly as chicken feed.

In all cases, subsidy is always bad policy. A free market always corrects itself and the effect of a subsidy on the price of a particular good is always neutralized, if not overridden, by the rise in prices of other goods. However, cuts in subsidies are always painful to beneficiaries and, by extension, governments. Therefore, the chief goal of our program on subsidies is to provide for socially adequate arguments for the removal of all subsidies. This will require a thorough and sympathetic study of the socio-economic factors of such a radical measure. Also, this program will be responsible for countering similar interventionist policies, e.g. minimum wage or price ceilings, which are not currently imposed in Egypt.

As with all economic policies deemed "neo-liberal", arguments for free international trade are extremely unpopular in Egypt. The notions of national self-sufficiency and protection of national industries, especially concerning "strategic goods", are fairly common. Our program on protectionist policies seeks to revise the legal framework on international trade on the basis of equal reciprocity of customs duties, multilateral agreements and free flow of capital. The program will thus develop a strong case for international trade, particularly by expounding on the concept of comparative advantage. 

Although the legal framework for international trade is still derived mainly from the socialist-era law 66/1963 on Customs, the Egyptian government pursues a fairly open international trade policy as a member of the World Trade Organization. But while the introduction of a unified flexible exchange rate in late 2004 was a huge step towards freer flow of capital, the movement of foreign capital remains somewhat restricted, with various obstacles to foreign ownership (e.g. of agricultural land, and land in Sinai).

As with all economic policies deemed "neo-liberal", arguments for free international trade are extremely unpopular in Egypt. The notions of national self-sufficiency and protection of national industries, especially concerning "strategic goods", are fairly common. Our program on protectionist policies seeks to revise the legal framework on international trade on the basis of equal reciprocity of customs duties, multilateral agreements and free flow of capital. The program will thus develop a strong case for international trade, particularly by expounding on the concept of comparative advantage. 

Informal markets make a huge portion of the Egyptian economy. This is partly the case because of the soft legal structure on property registration, and partly because of the general mistrust between property holders and the government. As for the former, we deal with it in our property rights program, but the latter requires compelling socio-economic arguments for both the public and governmet officials. 

In 1997, Hernando de Soto estimated the total worth of the informal sector, or Dead Capital as he calls it, to be worth US$ 240 billion in Egypt, almost three times the country's GDP at the time. This estimation might be exaggerated, but no one can deny that informal markets and unregistered assets account for a huge part of the Egyptian economy. In addition to their effect, or lack thereof, on tax revenues and credit, informal markets undermine the rule of law and distort the market. Recent regulatory policies, such as law 196/186 on Real Estate Taxes, complicate the problem as they scare off individuals from registering their property.

Our informal markets program seeks to review the legal framework for business and property registration in Egypt and to allow for the incorporation of these sectors into the market. Furthermore, we will design a public campaign encouraging people to register their businesses and property, and a crucial play could be to partner up with financial institutions to promote registration in exchange for credit.

For most Egyptians, monetary policy is an almost arcane subject. Therefore, and while we are fully dedicated to an independent and competent financial system,  this program is more about explaining questions than defending specific answers. As we struggle with the technical aspects of monetary policies, we will try our best to provide the public with clear choices in the simplest terms possible. 

The Egyptian financial and monetary system witnessed crucial reform with the enactment of law 88/2003 on the Central Bank, Banking Sector and Money. However while the law effectively gives the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) absolute power over monetary policy and financial regulation, it does not provide for sufficient measures to ensure the independence of CBE from government. For example, the law states that all members of the board of CBE are appointed by the President of the Republic (Article 12). Therefore, our monetary policy program seeks to revise the law to ensure the independence of CBE as well as the autonomy of private financial institutions on one hand, and on the other to monitor and critique the policies of CBE on a regular basis. Moreover, as monetary policy is one of the least discussed issues in Egypt, we will seek to bring it into public discussion in simple and accessible terms.