Liberty 101 is an extensive annual summer school for select potential recruits, on the basic concepts of Classical Liberalism and the context in which they emerged. The training materials will include our historical and economic visions and readings from Classical Liberal literature.

One of our most difficult challenges is the recruitment of new members. Although we meet with hundreds of Egyptian young men and women every year, very few of them are immediately fit for joining us, because the sweeping majority of Egyptian youth lack basic knowledge of political history and philosophy. This characterization is not due to arrogance on our side; our experience with such ridiculous gaffes as "World War Three" and "the State is the invisible hand of the market" (made by a political activist and a lecturer on economics, respectively) has taught us to really lower our expectations. It is beyond our reach to propose a radical solution to this problem, as it will require a total reconstruction of the Egyptian higher education and mass communication systems. Focusing on our own problem with recruitment, we have designed Liberty 101 as an extensive annual summer school for select potential recruits, on the basic concepts of Classical Liberalism and the context in which they emerged. The training materials will include our historical and economic visions and readings from Classical Liberal literature. The training will be conducted in seminar form, where trainers and participants informally discuss the subject at hand. As for history, documentary and docudrama films will be a major vehicle for information.

This program seeks to convey the fundamental concepts, issues and questions of Western Political Thought, ancient and modern, through fresh translations of Great Books which have shaped Western Civilization over the past 2500 years, in addition to a large collection of audio-visual material. 

The absence of a knowledge base on which a political society of Liberals can be founded has been a serious problem in Egypt and all over the Arab world for more than 75 years. The utter superficiality of the contemporary Egyptian and Arab political debate feeds directly on this absence, leaving the ideological and ethical momentum under the absolute authority of Islamist, Arab Nationalist and Socialist narratives. This program seeks to convey the fundamental concepts, issues and questions of Western Political Thought, ancient and modern, through fresh translations of Great Books which have shaped Western Civilization over the past 2500 years. We hope to introduce a new generation of Academics/Translators that are able to understand and convey the subtleties of these complex works. Our highest principle is to maintain the consistency and coherence of the works translated, through a Board of Editors composed of high profile scholars, preferably Arabic-speaking, who have tackled Great Books in their own research in Western universities.

In addition to books, we also hope to produce Audio Books (for dialog-based works) and DVDs (historical documentaries and docudramas). So far we have compiled a list of over 100 books and audio books, from Plato to Allan Bloom, and 20 DVD sets on topics ranging from Ancient Rome to the Regan Presidency.

Anti-Semitism is not merely a pervasive attitude in Egypt, but rather a fundamental element of the socio-political structure. While we are ethically compelled to condemn all forms anti-Semitism, the main reason why we choose to tackle this very sensitive issue is purely pragmatic. Anti-Semitism denies any possibility of a genuine transformation to Liberalism. The Egyptian people will not embrace Liberalism until it becomes clear to them that there never has been a Zionist conspiracy and that the failures of the past are to be blamed on none other than themselves and their leaders.

Anti-Semitism is not merely a pervasive attitude in Egypt, but rather a fundamental element of the socio-political structure. Commentators are divided over the explanation of this unfortunate fact into two main groups. The first argues that Islam is inherently anti-Semitic, and that the Egyptians, being predominantly Muslim, are no different in that respect. The second argues that the severity and longevity of the Arab-Israeli conflict planted hatred in the hearts of all Arabs for everything Jewish. We believe both are wrong.

Attributing anti-Semitism to Islam is based on two erroneous premises. First, it equates anti-Semitism, a strictly modern phenomenon, with the centuries-old religious hatred of the Jews. Anyone who has read Theodore Herzl's The Jewish State would know the difference. Second, it implies a vindication of the primary tenet of Islamism, what we call the Myth of Islamic Society, i.e. that Islamic teaching is the sole determinant of what all Muslims believe in and how they act. On the other hand, those who consider the creation of Israel to be the chief cause of Egyptian anti-Semitism fail to consider certain facts, such as the striking ties between nascent Egyptian Nationalism and Zionism until the late 1920s; various Egyptian Jews being both prominent Egyptian Nationalists and pioneering Zionists with no opposition from other Egyptians. As a matter of fact, we believe that it was the rising Arab Anti-Semitism that created, or at least exacerbated, the Arab-Israeli conflict, not the other way around. Proving this claim is one of the primary objectives of our historical revision program.

While we are ethically compelled to condemn all forms anti-Semitism, the main reason why we choose to tackle this very sensitive issue is purely pragmatic. Anti-Semitism denies any possibility of a genuine transformation to Liberalism, as the Jewish conspiracy theory makes it easier for individuals to surrender their responsibilities, and with them their freedoms, to totalitarian leaders who ruin their lives if they fail or perpetrate unspeakable atrocities if they succeed. The Egyptian people will not embrace Liberalism until it becomes clear to them that there never has been a Zionist conspiracy and that the failures of the past are to be blamed on none other than themselves and their leaders.

Therefore, rather than dwell on the superfluous distinction between Zionist and non-Zionist Jews as most Egyptian Liberals do, we seek to promote a coherent account of the origins of anti-Semitism, explain the philosophical and historical difficulties of the Jewish question and address the tension between Zionism and Liberalism. One major objective of the program is to establish the joint Arab-Jewish historical responsibility for the present Palestinian Problem in place of the traditional "blame-it-on-the-Jews" approach.

This program is designed to deal with the plight of Copts, who constitute the bulk of a Christian minority in the predominantly Sunni Muslim Egyptian society. Copts face many legal and social difficulties in contemporary Egypt, especially with the recent exponential growth in incidents of sectarian violence. While we believe that our proposals for reform are sufficient to counter all the legal problems of all religious and ethnic minorities in Egypt, social issues, in contrast, are much more complex. 

This program is designed to deal with the plight of Copts, who constitute the bulk of a Christian minority in the predominantly Sunni Muslim Egyptian society. Copts face many legal and social difficulties in contemporary Egypt, especially with the recent exponential growth in incidents of sectarian violence. We did not dedicate a legal program to Coptic grievances since we do not identify people by religion, ethnicity or any other supra-individual association in legal matters. However, we believe that our proposals for reform are sufficient to counter all the legal problems of religious and ethnic minorities in Egypt. Social issues, in contrast, are much more complex. Estranged from society by Islamist rhetoric and violence, thousands of Copts migrate to Western countries every year, whereas the millions left behind pursue all aspects of their social life with their church community; the clergy acting as their sole representative to the outside world. The situation has not yet amounted to self-imposed segregation, but it is certainly going in that direction.

The problem goes back to the very foundations of Egyptian modernity. Forged in the early 20th century as an essential component of the dominant Nationalist Liberalism, the concept of Unity of the Two Elements of the Nation (i.e. Muslims and Copts) precluded any significance of religion in the public sphere, thus granting Copts extensive representation in government and high society. However, Islam maintained a strong public presence as a cultural identity, which meant that Copts, under pressure from their leadership, had to efface or downplay their Christianity in public to protect National Unity. By the time the Nationalist Liberal Constitutional Monarchy was ousted with the 1952 military coup, Christianity had become a public taboo. Moreover, the Socialist Pan-Arab totalitarian rule of Nasser drastically undermined the political and financial position of Copts. Shortly after the defeat of 1967, the Nasserite totalitarian regime collapsed, and the incumbent authoritarian regime was built on its ruins, clearing the ideological arena for the Islamists to root out the traces of Nasserism, thus inaugurating the wave of systematic violence against Christians. Since then, the Egyptian State has persistently sought to maintain the façade of National Unity, suppressing sectarian tension through extra-legal measures, typically by striking reconciliatory deals with the clergy, which serves only to aggravate the tension beneath the surface.

This program seeks primarily to transcend the idea of National Unity by promoting diversity and difference as necessary pillars of a healthy society, particularly with regard to public expressions of religious faith. We will also try to help each side appreciate the cultural and philosophical depths of the other's religion, beyond the issues of individual faith and salvation. Furthermore, we will seek to raise and debate the more sensitive questions of a religiously diverse society, such as conversion and interfaith relationships.

While the shift from childhood to adulthood is difficult everywhere, it is especially so in Egypt. With countless social pressures, inadequate education and superficial popular culture, young Egyptian men and women often find themselves helpless figuring out who they are and what they want to do. This program asks the perennial question concerning the meaning of individual existence within society, and seeks to help our members and participants find an answer suitable to each. 

While the shift from childhood to adulthood is difficult everywhere, it is especially so in Egypt. With countless social pressures, inadequate education and superficial popular culture, young Egyptian men and women often find themselves helpless figuring out who they are and what they want to do. Children live with their parents until they get married, which could sometimes mean up to their late thirties. Reading is not a widespread habit, and even those who have it find very few choices before them, particularly when they cannot speak other languages than Arabic. Available Music, both Arabic and Western, is usually minimalistic and superficial. Television and Cinema are often confined to low forms of entertainment. While critics in all societies have similar opinions, the situation in Egypt is rather abysmal. In the end, Van Gogh's "Poppy Flower" was stolen in broad daylight from the only museum featuring Western art in Egypt less because of lax security than the poignant fact that no other visitors than the thieves were present; the museum received 11 visitors that day, all foreign tourists.

This program seeks to address the various aspects of this problem through direct interaction with our members and audience. Stressing financial independence from parents, we will promote successful examples of young people who live on their own money and in their own places. We will also feature reviews and discussions of great works of art, literature and music on our blog as well as in regular meetings. We will discuss the ethical aspects of intimate relationships, friendship, family, work and public behavior. All in all, this program focuses on the perennial question concerning the meaning of individual existence within society.

Minimal government means maximum freedom, but also maximum responsibility. Social Liberals often say that Classical Liberalism counts too much on the goodness of human beings. This is only true if we interpret individualism as selfishness, and liberty as license. Therefore, if we are to argue for Classical Liberalism in Egypt, we must try to help our fellow countrymen take over the enormous responsibilities heretofore undertaken by government.

Minimal government means maximum freedom, but also maximum responsibility. Social Liberals often say that Classical Liberalism counts too much on the goodness of human beings. This is only true if we interpret individualism as selfishness, and liberty as license. Therefore, if we are to argue for Classical Liberalism in Egypt, we must try to help our fellow countrymen take over the enormous responsibilities heretofore undertaken by government.

This program seeks to develop the case for philanthropy and social responsibility, sparing no effort towards the maximization of voluntary commitments to social causes, providing for international examples of privately-funded public institutions, focusing on education and healthcare. While we will not get involved in any particular cause, we will work closely with donors, foundations and charities to surmount the myriad legal and social obstacles they encounter.